

VIETNAM COURIER

January 27,

1969

No. 201

6th Year

Supplement

Well-known South Viet Nam
military commentator Cuu Long on
"South Viet Nam politico-military
situation in 1968"

Information Weekly - E.O. 46 Tran Hung Dao Street, Hanoi Democratic Republic of Viet Nam

One Year of General Offensives and Simultaneous Uprisings



PLAF fighters in Hue City

in South Viet Nam

FROM TET OFFENSIVES TO PARIS CONFERENCE

IN November 1968, Johnson organized Westmoreland's triumphant visit to Washington and a joint session of Congress to hear the C-in-C of U.S. armed forces in Viet Nam testify that victory had already appeared on the horizon, that "there was a light at the end of the tunnel" and that it was even possible to bring home a first batch of GIs by the end of 1968.

Less than three months later, the powerful general offensives and simultaneous uprisings broke out in South Viet Nam, carrying the war even into cities said to be "impregnable defended" by the aggressors, and "many Americans had a sense of having been somehow hoodwinked" (Newsweek, Feb. 20, 1968).

The feats accomplished by the South Vietnamese people and their armed forces in the early days of last lunar Year made a great stir in world opinion, especially American opinion. Wall Street Journal, an organ of U.S. big monopoly, in its Jan. 31, 1968 issue termed them as "the most aggressive, most far-flung and best co-ordinated communist assault of the entire war."

Everyone knows the catastrophic impact of this first wave of offensives and uprisings upon the U.S. - puppets:

Militarily, let us mention one-third of the Saigon army wiped out or disbanded, one-fifth of U.S. manpower decimated or put out of action, one-third of the enemy's aircraft and armored vehicles and an important part of

its war material destroyed. American propaganda did its best to conceal these considerable losses from the public but, as was revealed by many Western newspapers, U.S. officers in Saigon in private admitted them in all candor.

The blow was particularly devastating for the aggressors and their flunkies on the political plane: immense rural areas were overnight freed from their yoke, shattering their "WHAM" (win hearts and minds) program and paving the way for the ignominious departure of the ill-famed Mr. Komer, the program's administrator. What little authority the Saigon administration had been enjoying with the people in cities

(Continued page 4)

★ **SAIGON FRONT**: 7 enemy companies destroyed or decimated, 17 planes and helicopters brought down, 68 military vehicles wrecked and 7 vessels sunk or damaged.

★ **NEAR CAN THO**: 2 attacks against an airfield within 10 days, 75 planes and helicopters destroyed and 200 U.S. - puppet troops killed or wounded.

★ **IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS**: nearly 800 adverse casualties in the first half of January.

★ **HEAVY ENEMY LOSSES IN 2 "ACCELERATED PACIFICATION" OPERATIONS**: 2,000 men put out of action and more than 30 vessels sunk or damaged.

NIXON's inaugural speech was essentially adorned with flourishes, demagogic promises of a beautiful future for the Americans and professions to the world of U.S. goodwill for peace. Nixon dangled before the eyes of the American people a life built on equality and liberty in which Whites and Blacks join hands to advance towards progress. He even declared that he would cut spending saved from war expenditures for the improvement of living standards in the U.S.

Regarding foreign policy, the new U.S. President undertook to bend all his energies and wisdom on the service of peace between nations.

In short, Nixon's speech was a heap of theories and vague promises on future things and does not touch upon any of the big problems now confronting the U.S.: the failure and the stalemate of the war of aggression in Viet Nam, the choleric struggle of the Black people, the serious and prolonged financial crisis, times and other social evils, high living cost, etc., etc. The enormous difficulties are like

Nixon's inaugural address, an avowal of an impasse

ominous clouds hanging over the U.S. and Nixon himself had to acknowledge that "We (the U.S.) are caught in war," torn by division and "ragged in spirit." While the American people were expecting the new President to recommend remedies for all these ailments, Nixon gave none.

Nixon also chose to remain vague about the imperative demand of the American and other peoples in the world that an end be put to the war of aggression in Viet Nam. What is more, in proclaiming that the U.S. "will be as strong as we need to be" as long as we need to be, and that a "prolonged diplomacy" was ahead, Nixon betrayed to some extent his unwillingness to seek an early solution to the Viet Nam problem...

U.S. failure in Viet Nam and the position of the world's people and of the Americans themselves to the U.S. policy of war-marked aggression had forced Nixon, a well-known hawk, to soft-pedal and talk of peace in his inaugural speech. But this was a kind of vague peace, a Pax Americana which his predecessors already had dealt with at length. The experience of the U.S. "peace campaigns" has taught the world's peoples to remain vigilant before Nixon's hazy professions of peace. What they demand is genuine peace, peace in independence and freedom. So long as genuine peace and independence are not achieved, the U.S. representative, naturally chimed in.

Nhan Dan (The People)
Jan. 23, 1969

Hanoi Press Opinion

On Kissinger's article in "Foreign Affairs"

KISSINGER's article is characterized by patent obliquity: obliquity in covering up U.S. failure, obliquity in refusing to negotiate and settle the South Viet Nam problem, obliquity in clinging to the colonialist scheme to maintain South Viet Nam as a new-type colony of the U.S.

Kissinger avoids dealing with U.S. basic failure, but the fact is that the U.S. has sustained a thorough and heavy failure in its war of aggression in Viet Nam. Contrary to Kissinger's truism that "the U.S. must win if he does not lose, the conventional army loses it if it does not win," the U.S. has met with total bankruptcy in its policy and plan to seize South Viet Nam by armed force. The U.S. has failed completely in its "special war" and, in a large measure, in its "limited war." Hundreds of thousands of GIs have been wiped out; the Saigon administration has weakened and is plagued by deep splits; the puppet army with its sagging morale has been disintegrating by big chunks. The general offensives and widespread uprisings of the South Viet Nam armed forces and people since early 1968 have dealt another crushing blow to the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, driving them into serious strategic passivity. Far from attaining the goal of its war of destruction against the DRV, the U.S. has lost more than 3,000

troops ward off the stormy attacks by the PLAF. It is also being defeated.

Kissinger's military strategy is intended to prolong the war. But sure, it will do no good to the U.S. More than half a million American troops equipped with the best weapons were able neither to cope with the South Viet Nam armed forces and people nor to consolidate the puppet army and administration. Therefore, with a smaller army and a defensive strategy the U.S. will certainly take heavier losses, and the puppet administration will inevitably collapse.

Since the "special war" and "limited war" have both come to a flop, the U.S. scheme to use the puppet army to prosecute its colonialist war can only meet with more bitter setbacks.

Kissinger himself must be aware of the contradiction and predicament of the United States when he talks of a negotiated settlement. But, his colonialist scheme being not given up, in effect the overall bankruptcy of the U.S. war policy and plan—the biggest setback in the history of U.S. imperialist aggression.

In such a situation, to hope to win victory by a change of strategy is sheer illusion. In fact, the defensive strategy suggested by Kissinger is being carried out by the U.S. following the discomfiture of Westmoreland's "search-and-destroy" strategy, his successor Abrams has tried to "clear-and-hold" in an attempt to obliterate the "root causes," regain the control of the population and defend the towns. But this new strategy has so far been unable to help the U.S. and puppet

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PARIS PARLEY PROCEDURE APPROVED

The Paris conference on procedural matters in Paris on Jan. 18.

On their arrival, the delegation of the DRVN Government and that of the South Viet Nam NFL were enthusiastically greeted with cheers by hundreds of overseas Vietnamese and many Frenchmen and Frenchwomen who waved DRVN and NFL flags.

During the session, the representatives of the Saigon Administration repeated the "two-side" theme and the U.S. representative, naturally chimed in.

On behalf of the NFL delegation, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh recalled the Front's statement of November 3, 1968, which expressed its goodwill in accepting a quadripartite conference on Viet Nam. She also reaffirmed the 3 points of the NFL, the latest showed the right path for a peaceful solution to the South Viet Nam issue.

Strongly condemning the "two-side" theme produced by the U.S. and the Saigon Administration to negate and belittle the role of the NFL, the Front's envoy said:

"The NFL is the authentic representative of the legitimate aspirations of the South Vietnamese people.

The NFL delegation is attending this conference as a party independent from, and equal to, the other delegations, and is fully qualified to settle all questions related to South Viet Nam. The present Thieu-Ky-Huong administration in Saigon has

By opposing a coalition government and putting a "constitutional" and "legal" face on the Saigon lackeys, Kissinger cannot help the latter consolidate their position and avoid disintegration.

In short, Kissinger's article on "Viet Nam Negotiations" only sheds more light on the declining position of certain circles in the United States to prolong the military and political confrontation in South Viet Nam, in an attempt to cling to this part of Viet Nam NFL as a genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese people now struggling against the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen.

Since the NFL is for freedom, is competent to settle the South Viet Nam problem, the U.S. representative, naturally chimed in.

Nhan Dan (The People)
Jan. 17, 1969

been installed by the U.S. It is frantically crossing the people's aspirations for peace and independence, and is massacring our fellow-countrymen. Because of this, it is strongly opposed by the South Vietnamese people of all strata who want it replaced. The presence of the Saigon administration at this conference does not imply its recognition by the NFL."

The NFL spokesman said that his delegation deemed it necessary to hold full-scale debates by the four delegations at an early date of essential questions to find a correct political solution to the Viet Nam issue.

Ambassador Ha Van Lau, on behalf of the delegation of the DRVN Government, made clear in his speech that the many weeks long delay of the quadripartite conference was due to the U.S. Government's failure to act up to the agreements concluded with the representative of the DRVN Government, and to the obstacles deliberately set up by the Saigon Administration. The DRVN representative stressed that at this conference, the DRVN delegation and the

NFL delegation were two independent bodies, and that the aim of the conference was to find a political settlement on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, namely independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. He then put forward a draft project of the procedure of the conference.

"If the United States and the Saigon administration really want a political solution to the Viet Nam problem," Mr. Ha Van Lau pointed out, "the United States must renounce its aggressive design against South Viet Nam, and put an end to all infringements upon the sovereignty and threats to the security of the DRVN and the Saigon Administration must give up its bellicose policy that thwarts the South Viet Nam people's legitimate aspirations for independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, prosperity and the ultimate peaceful reunification of the country."

The session which was dragged out for five hours by the obliquity of the representatives of the Saigon Administration and agreed to hold the first plenary session in the following week.

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THE NORTH GREAT REAR BASE OF THE SOUTH A village's museum

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At day-break, they brought the road back to its normal home. They performed this job for nearly 3 years running until the enemy had to give the place up and aimed his attacks at another section.

Come and visit various families in N. village and you will find that at any moment, a heap of stones, some logs of timber and several bundles of wood lying in this or that corner of the house. Generally the stones are contributed by old men and women, the timber and faggots by the youth and militia and station staves by school-boys. These constitute the inexhaustible storage depots of the communications and transport service. A bomb which hit a house and damaged, a signal will be given and within moments, these things will flow in.

Could you imagine that under the enemy bombing, so intense as it was, people not only produced enough food to eat but also surpassed the quotas for delivery to the State? And this is a fact in N. village. The head of Production Team No. 2 of the co-op in Thien hamlet, Hung led a seven brigade militia to the rice fields near Bridge T. The work was in full swing when an enemy plane swooped down. He urged his fellows to take shelter, but he himself took a knock as the enemy's bomb landed close to the knoll and took Hung's life. When the enemy left the earth, they saw Hung still in a position ready to fire, looking up and his right hand on his trigger. The bunch of bamboo tapes still hung on his back.

Let's come back to the "Tropical Plant" sound-detector. Who is the first person in this village to have a great deal of study in hearing an enemy plane flying in at tree-top altitude and to detect the enemy's sound like an air-dropped bomb but no explosion was followed, old men and women thought that the more he thought, the more his suspicion grew. He rose early next morning and made a search in his garden. For

Platoon leader Pham Thi Thu who looks as frail and young as a girl, his shoulder killed an F-4 with its pilots captured. The captured F-4 was a young girl under 18, fought more than 100 battles but, when asked questions, she still shy of answering. I also met Pham Thi Mai immediately after the first battle of her combatant's life was over. She stood her back leaning against the wall of her gun pit and her face still streaming with perspiration. She said her white, black eyes around her as if to make out what people thought of her job as Gunner no. 2. Mai, 17, a bit tall, had a great deal of study in hearing an enemy plane flying in at tree-top altitude and to detect the enemy's sound like an air-dropped bomb but no explosion was followed, old men and women thought that the more he thought, the more his suspicion grew. He rose early next morning and made a search in his garden. For

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A COIL OF OLD ROPE

Do you notice the coil of rope, rather worn-out, which is prominently displayed on that table covered with white parachute cloth? Village N. has worsened the U.S. aggressors with only this perfectly rudimentary weapon. It is the coil of rope the militia men use every night to haul trucks and lorries across Bridge T., a section of the key communication line ranking and or rd in the province of Quang Binh as a target most fiercely attacked by the enemy. On an average, nearly every metre on this section of road which stretches over 3 kilometres had received a bomb. At night, at nightfall, the village militia swarmed onto the road, filling bomb craters and spread a kind of cause-way for cars to move through.

At day-break, they brought the road back to its normal home. They performed this job for nearly 3 years running until the enemy had to give the place up and aimed his attacks at another section.

Come and visit various families in N. village and you will find that at any moment, a heap of stones, some logs of timber and several bundles of wood lying in this or that corner of the house. Generally the stones are contributed by old men and women, the timber and faggots by the youth and militia and station staves by school-boys. These constitute the inexhaustible storage depots of the communications and transport service. A bomb which hit a house and damaged, a signal will be given and within moments, these things will flow in.

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Potatoes and rice here are often obtained at the cost of blood like that. Sometimes bombs destroy 20 or 30 hectares of land on a rice field. Deeply aware of the importance of rice for the rear line, the U.S. aggressors have never left any land fallow nor let the banner of intensive cultivation down.

For a straight years no sea waves had ever swept over Dyke H., thanks to good maintenance work. It has been a miracle indeed. The dyke has next to a river crossing and rarely a day passed without an enemy bombing or shelling. The irrigation work teams took turns in keeping permanent watch in underground shelters. As soon as the roaring of enemy planes died out, their members immediately resumed work. They had to be ready at the foot of the dyke, covering nearly two hectares, often by waste because of the damage caused by sea water. Now, in the midst of war, they have become used to haul trucks and lorries across Bridge T., a section of the key communication line ranking and or rd in the province of Quang Binh as a target most fiercely attacked by the enemy. On an average, nearly every metre on this section of road which stretches over 3 kilometres had received a bomb. At night, at nightfall, the village militia swarmed onto the road, filling bomb craters and spread a kind of cause-way for cars to move through.

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first seen fluttering over the roof of the communal house of village N. in the early days of 1965. Farther down, a pick with which the guerrilla fighter, Vo Dong, hit a French colonialist soldier in the back of the head in August 1960. On the first page of Tran Thi Sang's exercise book, perfoliated by steel pellets, you can read an essay on "Hoang Van Thu facing the firing squad..." (2).

This is the root of everything which means heroism in N. village.

NGUYEN SINH

(1) one "sam" equals 350 square metres.
(2) An outstanding leader of the Indochinese Communist Party was executed by the French colonialists.

NEWS IN BRIEF

● In 1968, the number of local industrial establishments built and put into operation almost equalled that of establishments built in 1966 and 1967. In Quang Binh, Ha Tinh and Nghe An provinces, close to the 17th parallel where, in 1965, US air and naval attacks were much more intense than in other regions, enterprises opened. In 1968, twelve regional workshops in Quang Binh province supplied local agricultural co-ops with 30,000 farm implements of different types. The gross output value of engineering in Nam Ha, Thi Binh, Hai Hung, Ha Tay and Ha Bac showed a rise from 50 to 100 per cent over 1967.

● A conference of intellectuals was held in Hanoi recently under the slogan "Let's be determined to defeat the U.S. aggressors!" Nearly 50 delegates from many army and labour heroes and meritorious fighters of the patriotic volunteer movement, represented brain workers of various branches of activity in the capital. Premier Pham Van Dong and Mr. Nguyen Phu Song, acting head of the South Viet Nam NFL, Permanent Representation in North Viet Nam visited the Conference.

● In 1968, the gross output value of locally-run light industrial enterprises surpassed the planned targets by 9 per cent compared with the preceding year. Output of cloth, house-hold utensils and food products—the 3 key products of light industry—increased by from 10 to 20 per cent. The gross output value of local handicrafts increased by 20 per cent over 1967.

Exciting Hours, Somewhere Around Da Nang

A year ago, general offensives and simultaneous uprisings broke out all over South Viet Nam. On the occasion of this anniversary, we publish some snapshots of recent happenings somewhere in the countryside around Da Nang on the night of January 30 1968 and the following morning. They were taken from a literary review published in the liberated area of Central Trung Bo. Ed.

It was late afternoon, an unusual bustle was stirring the whole village. Not because it was the eve of Tet, the traditional Lunar New Year's Day. Preparations had been going on for weeks before the festival, but this afternoon nobody had a thought for it.

Something much more important had been announced for the night: the opportunity had occurred for the people to avenge their dead and give vent to their hatred of the enemy, for so long a time. Everywhere, people got ready for the forthcoming battle. First of all, they feverishly armed themselves with all kinds of weapons, even the most rudimentary ones, mostly ropes and sticks. All kinds of ropes: coir ropes, bamboo spears, wooden staves, rattles retrieved from burned-down houses, iron railings... And of course cold steel: machetes, sabres, taken out of caches and refurbished, and kitchen knives of all sizes.

In an out-of-the-way place, the local committee of the NLF was taking their oath. Not an oath of office, but one for the leadership of the oncoming battle. The place was a house empty of all furniture, whose roof had been blown away by American bombs. A NLF flag, golden-star on a red-and-blue field, was hung on a dilapidated wall. The people present were of various ages, but all looked time-tested and trial-tempered and united by tight spiritual bonds. The last beams of the setting sun brightened the red of the flag and lit up their serious unperturbable features.

Amid deep silence, a young woman took the floor. Her voice, usually gentle and calm, took on a fiery tone. "Comrades," she said, speaking out each word, "tonight we shall meet at due punishment to the aggressors and the traitors. In a few hours' time, a great offensive by our forces will sweep the entire land."

In those solemn moments, each felt a lump in his throat. All thought of those who had fallen on the field of honour, and of those still languishing in enemy jails. They wished they could have wings to fly to battle!

gaping mouths and would let the people resume their march without interfering.

It was a glorious morning. Not a plane in the sky. Not a jeep or truck on the road. For the first time in many years, land and sky were ours. It was reported that large numbers of planes had been destroyed at the Da Nang and Nuoc Nam airfields, that the Hoi An provincial town and Vinh Dien district center had been stormed and the administrative HQ of Duy Xuyen district razed to the ground. Besieged and assaulted in their various lairs, the aggressors and puppets were signalling for help and calling each other names over their radios...

"Fighters' mothers" busied themselves preparing meals and refreshments which they brought or sent to their adopted sons, the Liberation troops: rice cakes, chicken, duck meat, etc. — the choicest delicacies they could find. But the busiest of all were the supply cadres. Nam because supplies were short, far from it: they flowed in such quantities that they were at a loss how to handle them.

"Look, where should we bring all this rice?" a peasant delegate yelled at them. "Hey, what about this buffalo, this ox and these pigs?" another would ask. "You don't see to care about our glutinous rice and poultry?" a group of women gently chided the harassed commissaries.

This is the Voice of Viet Nam... This is Radio Liberation...

In every village and hamlet, transistor sets received the news, which spread like wildfire. Everyone jumped for joy. Those who had been to Hue or Saigon drew hasty sketch-maps of those cities and proudly pointed to their fellow-villagers the various points under the Liberation troops' fire.

In an underground shelter, a mimeograph machine was operating at full speed, turning out news bulletins of the Information Department under the NLF provincial committee. Sent out even before the ink had dried on the sheets, they reached the guerrillas in their combat trenches, the machinegunners of the regional forces in their gun nests, the inhabitants of the remotest corners, even some of the Liberation troops hardly back from their onslaughts on Da Nang!

Like a cornered beast, the enemy struggled desperately. But the sword of the people's war was to deal him such blows that never, never would he recover his legs.

Editor's Note: We reprint below a report by Carl Stock, who spent a year and a half with the "American Friends Service Committee" in South Viet Nam, and who witnessed there the Tet generation of offensives and simultaneous uprisings. The report first appeared in Liberation, an American paper, in its September 1968 issue.

BEFORE I went to Viet Nam I was persuaded of the destructiveness of the U.S. military. I was opposed to American intervention in Viet Nam because its purpose was to suppress a popular revolution, but there was no doubt in my mind that such suppression was possible... After spending the last year and a half in Viet Nam I feel differently. First, it became apparent that the American military was not really winning; then it seemed that a stalemate prevailed, as sections of the press would still insist. The slightest hint of Tet offensive, the situation has been thrown into sharper focus. Now many believe that the war, from the standpoint of the United States, may be in the process of being lost. I would like to argue a case just one step more advanced: The war is already lost; Viet Nam has won.

How is it possible to say, with well over a million 'allied' troops still in the country and with jet bombers still devastating the land and the people, that Viet Nam has won? As in any war, the definition of victory or defeat depends on the objectives of each side. In the case of Viet Nam, in simplest terms, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the National Liberation Front are striving for the expulsion of foreign invaders and for the transformation of their own society, whereas Washington hopes to

achieve, apparently, a permanently separate South Viet Nam — a neo-colonial military and economic base, politically invulnerable to the temptations of revolution. The Vietnamese, excluding the Saigon-based hirelings, require 1) the absence of U.S. troops, 2) the absence of U.S. troops and administrators, and 3) local organization to meet the people's needs. The circumstances are unfavourable to them, they withdraw and then return when the

launching of 'search-and-destroy' operations from them... It has failed, however, in several ways. First, as regards combatants, the partial withdrawal of U.S. troops has often been directly compared to the effect of pulling one's fist out of a tub of water — the water simply rushes back into place; so it is with the NLF troops. If the circumstances are unfavourable to them, they withdraw and then return when the

apparently preferring cave dwelling in free-strike zones to American "protection"... Second, those who were in the camps are understandably bitter toward the aggressors and they form a ready-made fifth column in the American rear areas...

The inability of the United States to control the countryside is reflected in the fact that troops are concentrated in large bases. That fact, in turn, determines

those tendencies, already present, have simply advanced farther in the same direction, but to such an extent as to introduce a new qualitative element in the war. Just think how the war has changed. A few years ago it used to be sensational news if a "Vietcong terrorist" penetrated Saigon and threw a grenade into a military billet. Today no one worries about individual soldiers. Liberation troops are stationed inside Saigon and major battles occur in the city. It used to be cause for concern when an aircraft was downed while prowling above the remote jungle. This year helicopters have been shot down right over Saigon... Last year I could, with some risk, travel over much of South Viet Nam by land, but today that is out of the question, and even Highway 4, running through the Mekong Delta, is the scene of constant ambushes and mining of bridges. Another development of even greater consequence to American military fortunes, is the tremendous material suffered since Tet. American officials in Saigon predict that the U.S. has lost at least a thousand aircraft were lost during the Tet offensive, and many more have been destroyed since then.

Regardless of official attitudes toward General Gavin's "enclave theory," that notwithstanding, the fact is that the U.S. and Saigon troops have been largely pulled back to the cities, and cities, where they are under continuous attack by the People's Liberation Army of Viet Nam (PLAF). Many do not understand why the NLF is fighting in the cities, especially Saigon, which is really quite simple: That is all that is left to fight for. The war is over; the NLF has won.

Since the Tet offensive (Continued page 7)

VIET NAM HAS WON THE WAR

porters and 2) occupy territory and maintain strict control of the population. Let us now look at what has happened in terms of those objectives.

First, it will be readily seen that the NLF depends on the support of the people in order to wage the war of resistance. That 'political half' of the war was never really open to dispute — deep-seated patriotism set the people against the American occupiers before the latter could even get started... Conversely, the United States has had to wage war against the people to prevent them from organizing and supporting their armed representatives and the failure of strategic handlets and special 'garage,' the U.S. command developed the strategy which still clings to — the occupation of small enclaves and the

invaders have left... The effect of the operations, then, is to ravage the countryside and change political control. The Americans have been more successful, however, in two other respects. They have been able to kill large number of non-combatants, especially in densely populated areas, and they have terrorized many people and forced them into camps "generated refugees". But in terms of U.S. objectives both these successes have backfired. The slaughter of civilians has made the survivors more militantly resistant to American occupation and has done so right in the heart of the densely populated cities. The "refugees" situation has backfired in two ways. First, over the past years many people have fled from the camps in increasing numbers,

two other difficult circumstances: about eighty percent of the U.S. forces are non-combat support troops; second, many of the combat troops are necessary for the defense of those bases. The National Liberation Front, on the other hand, is not tied down to bases. Local guerrillas defend the villages and thus permit the regular army to be a permanently mobile force. Although outnumbered, the Liberation troops are one hundred percent effective; they both control territory and muster strength for major battles. All the above has been true ever since the NLF reached large proportions in 1965. That is to say, the NLF has always had the upper hand, enjoying the support of the people and exercising effective administration over most of the country.

From Tet Offensive to Paris Conference

(Continued from page 1)

tightly controlled by them, sent up in smoke taking with it the aggressors' hopes for the consolidation of an indigenous government that could serve as a screen for their neo-colonialist designs. Admittedly Henry Kissinger, the new U.S. President's adviser on national security matters: "One result of the Tet offensive was to delay — perhaps indefinitely — the consolidation of governmental authority" (See Foreign Affairs, January 1968).

Everywhere, the people rose up, organized themselves and built up revolutionary power. It was in this stirring atmosphere that the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces emerged as the symbol of the widening of the national front of struggle against U.S. aggression.

A new page was turned in South Viet Nam's history: the "limited war" unleashed by the Yankees was defeated at the very moment when their efforts had practically reached a peak and the total number of troops in the American Expeditionary Corps was about to hit a ceiling politically acceptable to the American people. The aggressors

were thus compelled to scrap their "peripheral" strategy which also consisted of big-scale counter-offensives, and to shift over to a defensive strategy concentrating on the protection of important bases and densely populated areas.

Their aggressive will having been blunted — the more so as their military advisers in Viet Nam had also ended up in painful failure — they had to seek political settlement which was designed to secure them the neo-colonialist positions they had not been able to conquer by the force of arms.

That is what lay behind President Johnson's March 31, 1968 speech and his decision to "limit the bombing" of the DRVN. That is also what lay behind the dilly-dally moves by the Americans in their so-called search for peace: one month was squandered by them before giving their agreement to the site of DRVN-USA talks, 6 months to allow those talks to be crowned with the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing against North Viet Nam, and 2 and a half months to recognize the NLF as a status with the other delegations at the quadripartite Conference.

The unfolding of all these events show to what extent the U.S. imperialists could be obstinate. The main factor that was responsible for the overcoming of their obstinacy was again the successive setbacks inflicted on them by the Vietnamese people.

INDEXED, from March 31, 1968, to Jan. 10, 1969 (date of the U.S.-puppet acceptance of a route to the Paris negotiations) the struggle of the Vietnamese people continued to achieve successes. In North Viet Nam, U.S. air attacks concentrated on the four Southern provinces resulted in the loss of over 400 additional U.S. planes and a not negligible amount of U.S. pilots.

The major battle was fought in South Viet Nam. The offensives and uprisings in May, then in August-September 1968, cost the U.S. puppets nearly 200,000 casualties and the destruction of thousands of aircraft, armoured vehicles and a considerable quantity of war materials.

Abyme's new strategy of "clear-and-hold" seemed put to trial, proved to be powerless in face of the stormy assaults launched by the PLAF against big cities and important U.S. bases whereas a plan for "defence in depth" had been minutely elaborated. Entire enemy bat-

talions were wiped out in the heart of Saigon, the belt of fortifications around Da Nang burst open, and many enemy lairs were pounded by people's artillery by day and by night. Politically, each wave of offensives took away — as a Western journalist put it — a bit of the puppet's power. The revolution of effectiveness now prevailing in Saigon and other South Vietnamese cities under such slogans as "End U.S. aggression!" "Down with the five-point Thieu-Ky-Huung clique!" "For the independence of the country!" is a clear indication of the complete isolation of the aggressors and their henchmen.

And most recently, the first step in January 1969, which witnessed a continuation of the offensives started a year ago, was characterized by the widespread and widespread PLAF attacks on all battlefields and on enemy key depots, as well as the numerous guerrilla activities which foisted the U.S.-puppet "accelerated pacification" programme.


While in Paris the aggressors and their puppet allies were forced to accept the NLF presence at the round-table negotiations, they nevertheless persist in ignoring its decisive role in the settlement of "South Viet-

namese problems on the basis of its five points expounded on Nov. 3, 1968. In South Viet Nam, the U.S. imperialists are pursuing their illusory plan of "de-Americanizing" the war, i.e. carrying on their aggression with a little less GIs (whose repatriation is forcefully demanded by American families) and much more South Vietnamese. All efforts are being exerted by the aggressors to destroy the structure of the puppet administration: muzzling of the press, mass arrests, summing up of sentences passed on young students claiming the return of peace, etc.

One must therefore expect considerable difficulties in the Paris negotiations, as a result of neo-colonialist ambitions the U.S. cannot but bring themselves to give up.

They only learn from their setbacks. The ones sustained in 1968 already brought the U.S. Administration to its senses and to a series of backing-down moves.

May the coming events of 1969 — which will certainly be brought about by the sweeping process of offensives and uprisings staged by South Viet Nam's forces — drive home to the Nixon administration the advisability of the only reasonable course of action: put an end to U.S. aggression against Viet Nam!



PLAF scouts in Ha Dien mountain region (Tay Ninh province)

VIETNAM AND THE WORLD

VIET NAM HAS WON THE WAR

(Continued from page 5)

PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH'S MESSAGES

To Comrades:
L.I. Brezhnev, Secretary General of the CC of the CPSU,
N.V. Podgorniy, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet,
A.N. Kossygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers,
Moscow.

On the occasion of the new marvellous triumph of the Soviet Union in achieving the successful launching of the two spacecraft "Soyuz-5" and "Soyuz-6", I am very happy to express, on behalf of the Vietnamese people, the Viet Nam Workers' Party and Government of the Democratic

Republic of Viet Nam, our warmest congratulations to you and, through you, to the people, Communist Party and Government of the Soviet Union, and all the Soviet scientists, engineers and workers who have contributed to this great achievement.
The skilful link-up of the two manned spacecraft and the transfer of one cosmonaut from one craft to the other has marked a new step forward and opened bright and great prospects in the conquest of outer space by the Soviet Union.
Please accept my Communist greetings.

Hanoi, January 19, 1969.
HO CHI MINH

To the International Conference In Support of the Peoples of Portuguese Colonies and Australasia,
Khartoum.

On behalf of the Vietnamese people I wish to convey to you our warm greetings. Your Conference is a token of militant solidarity between the peoples of the Asian and African countries for national independence, democracy, peace and social progress and against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, headed by U.S. imperialism. The struggle of the peoples of Austral-Asian countries as well as that of the Asian and Latin American peoples in general is continuously attacking imperialism and colonialism and are sowing ever greater achievements. The Vietnamese people are confident that the Asian and African peoples, closely united in their unflinching struggle, will bring their national liberation to fruition.

The Vietnamese people fully support the struggle for national liberation of the peoples of Angola, the Congo (Kinshasa), Guinea, Cape Verde, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, South-West Africa and other Asian and African countries. As an expression of their solidarity, the Vietnamese people, in the interest of their successes, are resolved to win total victory over the U.S. aggressors and to fulfil their glorious historic task towards their own nation and their internationalist obligation toward the friendly peoples who are fighting imperialism.
I sincerely thank you for your sympathy, courage, and active support to our people's resistance against U.S. aggression, for national salvation.
Good success to your Conference.

Hanoi, January 17, 1969
HO CHI MINH
President of the DRVN

20th Founding Anniversary of Lao People's Liberation Army (January 20, 1969)

Lao PLA: Heroic Army of a Heroic People

STEELED by twenty years of trial, the Lao PLA has now become a well-seasoned army resolved to fight and to win, the voucher for total victory of the Lao people in their struggle against the American aggressors for national salvation. It has given proof of a lofty spirit of revolutionary heroism, offensive and combative and has achieved gallant exploits.

In the nine years of the resistance to the French colonialists it fought 3,000 battles, put out of action 12,000 enemy troops, including nearly 1,000 officers, seized 20,000 weapons and more than 300 tons of military equipment. Then, it embarked on a fight against U.S. aggressions which marks a very glorious stage in the history of the Lao people.

So far, more than 100,000 troops of the U.S. henchmen have been wiped out and more than 800 U.S. aircraft shot down or destroyed. The military successes in 1968 stood out as a brilliant feat with the wiping out of more than 20,000 enemy troops and the destruction of more than 170 aircraft, which represent an important amount of the

enemy's manpower and materials, bringing about a major change in the balance of forces in favour of the patriotic forces and driving the U.S. and its lackeys into passive defence. Early 1969, the patriotic army mounted a surprise attack on the biggest ammunition depot of the U.S. henchmen in the area, and sowed confusion and fear among the enemy.

The Lao PLA which is composed of three categories of forces (regular army, regional troops and militia and guerrillas) is excellent in combat either against the puppet troops which seek to encroach upon the liberated area or against the U.S. air pirates who bomb that area. It has been fulfilling satisfactorily the noble historic mission which is to thwart the U.S. "special war", and defend the liberated areas in order to build up a peaceful, independent, peaceful, neutral, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos.

It epitomizes the spirit of unity and grim determination to the struggle of the Lao people for various reasons. The Vietnamese people, from north to South of the country, under the banner of the Lao Patriotic Front, headed by Prince Souphavanna, are fighting

unworn. It is the heroic army of a heroic people.

The rapid growth of the Lao PLA and the big victories of the revolutionary war in Laos can be ascribed to the sound line of the Lao Patriotic Front, unite the entire people, build a firm revolutionary army, develop the people's war, fight and build its forces at the same time, defeat step by step the U.S. imperialists' scheme of aggression and advance towards complete victory.

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Lao People's Liberation Army, the armed forces and people of Viet Nam send their warmest congratulations to the noble historic mission which is to thwart the U.S. "special war", and defend the liberated areas in order to build up a peaceful, independent, peaceful, neutral, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos.

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In Support of Viet Nam's Struggle

Big Meeting in Paris

In response to the appeal of the French Peace Movement, some 4,000 representatives of the French people of all strata gathered on January 16 at the "Palais de la Mutualite" in Paris to express their support for the Vietnamese people's legitimate struggle against U.S. aggression. The speakers at the meeting warned Nixon at the meeting warned Nixon that there was only one honorable way out for the U.S.: to withdraw its troops from South Viet Nam.

Present at the meeting were many leaders of the French Peace Movement and prominent peace fighters like Prof. René Noseran, Pastor René Rognon, Pastor Francis Boes, Lawyer Leo Matrasso, etc.

Also attending were Georges Machais, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, and many leaders of the French mass organizations.

Taking the floor at the rally, Jean Schaefer, member of the National Council of the

French Peace Movement, Secretary of the French General Confederation of Labour, who was in the chair pointed out the strong support given Viet Nam by the French people and other peoples in the world. He also reaffirmed the insistent demand of those present that Nixon "stop at once U.S. aggression in Viet Nam".

The delegation of the French Peace Movement, back from a recent visit to Viet Nam, strongly denounced the U.S. imperialists' crimes in Viet Nam and warmly praised the Vietnamese people's determination to fight and to defeat the U.S. aggressors.

The participants unanimously passed a resolution addressed to U.S. President Nixon and urging an immediate and complete end to the U.S. aggression in Viet Nam, total withdrawal of U.S. and satellite troops from South Viet Nam and respect for the Vietnamese people's right to decide themselves their destiny.

Washington Stages Anti-War Protests on Nixon's Inauguration

On the occasion of Nixon's inauguration as President of the United States, large crowds of Americans marched on Washington on January 19 and to demand an end to the U.S. aggressive war in Viet Nam and protest against the belligerent policy of the U.S. ruling circles, in response to a call of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam (USA), foreign reports said.

On the eve of the inaugural day, some 10,000 American youths and other people held a mass rally in front of the Washington Monument near the White House and then paraded along the Pennsylvania avenue.

They carried placards reading: "Nixon's number one war criminal", "Billionaires rule - Success for their tool", "Aggression in South East Asia, Shame to USA!", and "The NFL Will Win".

It was the first time a demonstration of this size had been staged in connection with a presidential inauguration, *Reuter* remarked.

At the forefront of the marching column stretching over half a mile were a group of active duty servicemen opposed to the U.S. war of aggression in Viet Nam.

Using rocks, mud and sticks as weapons, the demonstrators valiantly fought

against a large police force.

On the night of January 19, as Nixon attended an inaugural concert, anti-war protesters held their own "counter-inaugural" ball, after marching through Washington streets and chanting, "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh" and other slogans against the Viet Nam war.

On the same day, 5,000 demonstrators blighted a reception for incoming Vice-President Spiro Agnew held at Smithsonian Institute.

On Jan. 20, as Nixon's inauguration ceremony took place at the White House, a 10,000-strong demonstration was held just in front of the building, one hour before the inauguration march.

Many demonstrators deliberately hurled stones on Nixon's car which had to career at full speed, without avoiding being hit, *AP* reported.

The authorities in Washington had called in 20,000 troops and policemen to form a security belt around Nixon during his inaugural day.

Three helicopters loaded with secret agents performed a lowflying over the new President's bullet-proof car from the Capitol to the White House. Nobody was allowed to stand at the street corners. The streets followed by the inauguration march and only those with identification cards were allowed to enter the area. The demonstrators valiantly fought

Presidium of the meeting in support of Viet Nam held on Nov. 23, 1968 by 6,000 Parisians

BINH SON district, adjacent to the Chu Lai base of the U.S. aggressors, has since mid-1965 become the front line of the anti-U.S. war of resistance of the Quang Ngai province people. After the historic battle of Van Tuong which inflicted the first setback on the U.S. troops in South Viet Nam, the U.S. imperialists landed on Binh Son tens of thousands of American troops to be beefed up soon by the Blue Dragon Brigade of the Pak Jung Hi mercenaries.

They have been nearly all villages in the district, the aggressors indulged in free rampages, savage raids and bombings and strafings of the civilians and destruction of houses and crops. For their part, the Pak Jung Hi mercenaries committed wholesale murders, killing at a time 100 old people, women and children in a village.

In the first days of enemy occupation, not a few in Binh Son asked themselves how to continue sending their children to school and how to free themselves from illiteracy. But, with their long tradition of dauntless struggle, the Binh Son people took the decision to "continue education as a means of fighting the Yankee aggressors".

Then, from the middle of 1966, the mass education movement was quickly resuming its steady headway throughout the district.

Alphabet classes for adults, pre-school classes for children, and primary and elementary classes of general education for pupils were opened throughout the liberated area, in the corridor around enemy bases, and even behind the enemy line.

Here, teaching and learning is a bitter daily and hourly struggle against the enemy. Teachers and pupils put into effect the slogans "There are classes everywhere" and "We'll learn, even with one teacher and one pupil". In many cases, the adults attending ABC

classes have been given to the protection of the classes, teachers and students. Many villagers have readily offered their homes to be used as classrooms or allowed classrooms to be built in their gardens. Every time enemy troops come they are the first to come out and dissuade them from burning the schools.

For three consecutive years, the literacy classes for adults, the infant classes as well as the primary and elementary schools in Binh Son have been running smoothly and more than 200 others, mostly cadres and guerrillas, attended complementary courses. In

particular, three villages and three hamlets have done away with illiteracy and possess now many complementary classes. The schools in the district have completed their programs, which provide basic knowledge to the students. The teachers have strictly kept to the collective preparation of the lesson plans, they have been continually improving their teaching methods, closely linking education to the reality of the fighting, production and social life in their localities, offering effective assistance to those pupils who lag behind.

Inbued with a deep sense of urgency for national salvation which they learnt at the revolutionary school, hundreds of pupils have joined the People's Liberation Army. In a drive for voluntary military service, all the pupils of an elementary school in Binh Son unanimously applied to join up, and 30 of them qualified. Together with their teachers they formed a platoon named "Ba to (3) Binh Son", which afterwards recorded many brilliant achievements in the fight against the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen.

The pupils and school mistresses in Binh Son have also been staunch fighters in the political struggle. In the first days of the general offensives and widespread uprisings in early 1968, all the pupils and teachers of the primary and elementary schools also took to the streets.

N embattled Binh Son, the schools and classes have become real battlefields while the teachers and students are valiant fighters against U.S. aggression.

Secondly, there are any chance that the United States will escape the military mind, round a corner and surge on to eventual victory. In order to do so, it would have to cancel out the concentration-dispersal contradiction by gaining the support of the people, something that the United States is farther from today (after bombing the cities) than ever before. No, the support of the people or WHAM (Winning Hearts and Minds) is an item that the Americans seem to have lost all interest in. With their backs to the walls they blaze away with both barrels, but they are running out of ammunition. The United States can still hang on for a long time before finally admitting defeat.

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The battlefield has been transferred from the NLF's rear to the U.S.-Saigon rear. In fact, the American rear support, has been pulled out from under them.

The political effects of the military shift have been equally disastrous for the U.S. position. With the Air Force dropping high explosives into the middle of Saigon, urban people have found it more and more difficult to be fence-sitters... So it was no surprise when the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces emerged. Composed of respected bourgeois intellectuals willing to cooperate with the National Liberation Front to drive out the American invaders, the Alliance represents the radicalizing of the city people and the opening of the last stage of the American occupation. Politically discredited to begin with, the United States was then defeated militarily from

one end of the country to the other and finally bottled up in tiny enclaves, where now their last hope, bourgeois support, has been pulled out from under them. Admitted, then, that Viet Nam has won, the questions now are: 1) How has the U.S. defeat been possible? 2) Is there any prospect for changing the situation? The first question has already been answered except for its theoretical interpretation — the "concentration-dispersal" contradiction. In the war of resistance against the French, the U.S. defeat has been possible either they dispersed so as to occupy territory and thus had no offensive or defensive might, or else they concentrated their forces to attack and defend a ceded territory. They could not have it both ways. The Americans, of course, are in just the same bind but, unlike the French, have never tried any serious effort to occupy territory, apparently believing in their own propaganda that that was the job of the Vietnamese. With the emphasis always more or less on concentration, the U.S. forces have committed themselves to the defense of their own cities; that is, the concentration has been passive, and the mobile PLAF have lost their bogged-down enemy...

Secondly, there are any chance that the United States will escape the military mind, round a corner and surge on to eventual victory. In order to do so, it would have to cancel out the concentration-dispersal contradiction by gaining the support of the people, something that the United States is farther from today (after bombing the cities) than ever before. No, the support of the people or WHAM (Winning Hearts and Minds) is an item that the Americans seem to have lost all interest in. With their backs to the walls they blaze away with both barrels, but they are running out of ammunition. The United States can still hang on for a long time before finally admitting defeat.

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TO THE READER

We are aware that there is much room for improvement in the wording of our paper. We apologize for this shortcoming and big thanks to the readers for their suggestions as they will help us to serve you more efficiently in future.

(1) Name of a locality made famous by an uprising against French colonialism.

ON THE LARGE SOUTHERN FRONT

MILITARY OPERATIONS

Enemy Under Attack from All Sides Across South Viet Nam

THE PLAF continued attacking the enemy without let-up in the whole territory and in multiple forms: stormy assaults against enemy positions and base camps, intensive shelling of carefully selected targets, ambushes on road and river convoys, bold and effective surprise attacks by groups of guerrillas in the rural areas, or self-defence groups in the cities even in Saigon.

The patriots' actions were particularly intense on the Saigon front and in the Mekong Delta. Following are the main ones:

In the province of Tay Ninh, on the night of Jan. 10, in the provincial capital 7 km Northwest of Saigon and in several other urban centres, attacks followed by popular uprisings cost the enemy 150 men killed or wounded. Next day, in sinking a patrol boat and damaging another on the Oriental Vam Co river, the regional district of the province wiped out about one hundred adverse troops. On Jan. 13, 4 other vessels were sunk on the same river at Ben Dinh, 70 km Northwest of Saigon.

On the following day, 31 ambushes were laid by the PLAF in the vicinity of Dat Set (10 km East-South-east of Tay Ninh) against 3 enemy road convoys: 30 military vehicles were destroyed and more than a GI's hundred knocked out.

On Jan. 15, 11 other vehicles were destroyed during an attack on the encampment of a mechanized infantry unit at Bau Co, 18 km Northeast of Tay Ninh.

On the same day, near Ben Sol, about 15 km West-Southwest of Tay Ninh, 2 puppet companies were wiped out, suffering 60 casualties and the loss of a large quantity of arms and materials. 5 aircraft including one jet shot down and 3 trucks destroyed. Next morning, the relief forces were intercepted and a 3rd company was put out of action.

In the province of Binh Long, about 100 km North of Saigon, in an ambush on Route No 12 on Jan. 12, the PLAF wrecked 17 tanks and armoured cars, shot down 3 helicopters and killed or wounded 120 GI's.

Further Northwest, in the province of Phuoc Long, an attack was reported by Giai Phong Press Agency against a position of the "1st Air Cavalry" at Bu Nho (8 km South of Phuoc Binh provincial capital) on Jan. 10; 2 U.S. companies were wiped

out, 4 helicopters shot down and 2 heavy mortars destroyed. This was the 2nd disaster of the "Flying Horsemen" in this area where on Jan. 1, 2 other companies (not one as reported earlier) were put out of action.

Western news agencies further reported the attacks in the province of Tay Ninh, Jan. 21 in the sector of the Saigon front, especially in Phouc Long, Tay Ninh, Yang Tau and Saigon. In broad daylight, the airfield and the military port of Yang Tau, a big U.S. aero-naval base 62 km Southeast of Saigon, were subjected to 2 poundings on Jan. 23 causing serious enemy losses in men and material (including a major landing craft sunk). Bases of the U.S. 25th Infantry division, 100th Light Infantry brigade and 1st Infantry division, also came under heavy shelling while enemy installations in the district of Saigon and the U.S. Nha Be naval base were plastered.

In the Mekong Delta, a dashling coup was undertaken against the Lo Te airfield, some kilometres West of Can Tho city where the puppet 4th corps HQ is located (130 km Southwest of Saigon). After 35 minutes of shelling, the PLAF won control of the terrain on Jan. 13 and proceeded with the systematic destruction of enemy aircraft with satchel charges and grenades. A combatant was credited with destroying 12 and another, 8. Ten days earlier, this same airfield had already received about 100 rounds of big gun fire pumped by the patriots who inflicted great damage on it. All told, during these 2 raids, the enemy lost 75 aircraft destroyed, mostly helicopters, or three-quarters of the total number of aircraft stationed at the airfield, 11 armoured cars and an arm depot capable of equipping 3 enemy battalions completely burnt and 200 men, mostly GI's.

Closer to Saigon, in the province of My Tho, the enemy was hard hit in the provincial capital and in almost all important urban centres and military bases between Jan. 10 and Jan. 15, and took 300 casualties, including 130 GI's, killed or wounded.

On the night of Jan. 18 another wave of attacks flared up again in this province only some 40 km from Saigon.

In the Southernmost peninsula, the large-scale pacification operation conducted by

6,000 US-puppet troops (13 battalions) from Dec. 22, 1968 to Jan. 6, 1969 in 20 villages in the U Minh area ended with heavy losses: 1,000 of the raiders were put out of action (including 200 GI's), 32 vessels sunk, burnt and 7 helicopters downed.

In the province of Ban Tre, village, guerrillas of Giong Troi district inflicted 300 casualties on the adversary including 200 GI's and brought down 4 helicopters in the first 10 days of January.

Heavy mortaring was reported by Western news agencies against 50 enemy positions between Jan. 17 and Jan. 23, particularly against the U.S. Binh Duc base, near My Tho, and the military sector HQ's installed in the provincial capitals of Ca Mau, Me Tho, Vi Thanh, Hoi Men, Chua Doc and Go Cong.

In the Western Highlands' in the first half of January, the patriots fought at least 45 combats, put 780 enemy troops (and GI's) out of action, destroyed 36 vehicles including 14 armoured cars, 6 cannons and heavy mortars, grounded 10 choppers and planes and burnt nearly 2 million litres of fuel.

West of Pleiku, Highway No 19 was cut at several points on Jan. 14 and 350 sections of pipelines destroyed. Next day, intercepting the enemy moving in on a repair mission, the patriots destroyed 5 tanks.

Western news agencies reported other actions in this area in the 3 day ending Jan. 21: bombardment of U.S. An Khe base (235 km South-Southeast of Da Nang) and a position of the U.S. 173 Airborne Brigade about 150 km Northeast of Saigon, infantry attacks against the camp of U.S. officers in Da Lat (227 km Northeast of Saigon) and the Buon Me Thuot radio station (250 km Northwest of Saigon), etc...

In the Da Nang sector, in the district of Dai Loc, 28 km Southwest of the city, a U.S.-puppet large-scale "accelerated pacification" operation launched on Dec 11, last ended on Jan. 7 in bitter failure: 1,000 men put out of action (including 200 GI's and South Korean mercenaries), one jet and 2 helicopters brought down and 2 pieces of artillery destroyed. In another district about 20 km South-Southeast of Da Nang, in the first 11 days of this year, the PLAF knocked out 200 adverse soldiers.

On the other hand, Western news agencies reported: 2 poundings on Jan. 22 of the air base and military port of Da Nang which sustained heavy damage, and a PLAF heavy shelling with mortars and shelling on Jan. 17 of 2 enemy positions in the province of Binh Dinh at the 14 th parallel.

A remarkable exploit of the guerrillas of Quang Ngai province (some 100 km Southeast of Da Nang) was recently reported by Giai Phong Press Agency: between early Nov. 1968 and Jan. 6, 1969 they downed 20 and damaged 3 enemy helicopters and planes. Those of village N. in 2 days grounded 5 aircraft and a village militia leader

was credited with the downing of 2 helicopters and 1 jet and damaging 2 other helicopters.

In South Viet Nam's northernmost sector, in the Cao Tien and Ten Lam (Rockpile) areas, 150 enemy casualties among their 115 GI's were listed between Jan. 1 and Jan. 14.

NEWS IN BRIEF

Saigon Intellectuals Publish Manifesto

ANY Saigon intellectuals have recently made public a manifesto urging "an immediate political solution for peace" in South Viet Nam, Giai Phong Press Agency reported. Its signatories were Tran Ngoc Leng, a barrister, Ly Thanh Trung, Chai Tam Lam and Tran Kim Thach, professors; Nguyen Hu Thien, architect; and Phan Van My, a businessman.

The manifesto, issued at a time when the mass movement for peace was sweeping South Vietnamese towns, underscored that South Viet Nam must adopt a political line "based on independence, democracy and freedom".

Buddhists Stage Peace Prayers

ON January 6, numbers of Buddhist female believers held at An Quang pagoda (Saigon) a religious service, in the memory of a man who had burnt himself to death in protest to the U.S.-puppet dictatorial regime.

The participants in the ceremony passed a petition urging that the Paris peace talks should be held in good faith in order to put an end to the war and restore peace.

GIs Protest en masse U.S. war in South Viet Nam

— 3,000 GI's supported by 1,000 Vietnamese workers and hands at Dong Du demand repatriation.

— 2 American divisions at Binh Duc refuse an "accelerated pacification" operation.

ON December 27, 1968, at 1 p.m., 3,000 American soldiers and officers at Dong Du base near Chi 350 km Northwest of Saigon (Saigon) displayed streamers and posters demanding an end to the U.S. Viet Nam war and repatriation, Giai Phong Press Agency reported. The demonstration lasted the whole afternoon despite counteraction by "security" officers and spread to all sectors in the base.

As a token of solidarity 1,000 Vietnamese workers and hands working at the base downed tools to back the GI's claims.

On December 28, the demonstrators continued to hold meetings all day long. NFL leaflets were passed from hand to hand and even read aloud. The workers' strike went on until December 30.

Another report of the same agency said that on December 20, American servicemen of Battalion 1 and 2, U.S. Infantry Division 9 at Binh Duc, near My Tho, left bank of the Mekong river, refused an "accelerated pacification" operation. The enemy Military police hurled tear gas grenades at the mutineers, which incited 150 GIs to throw down their weapons and uniforms and break their ranks. The following day, the U.S. command had to move off immediately one of the battalions.